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INTERNET SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS
Leora Harpaz*
I. INTRODUCTION

When I first decided to write about the increasing incidence
of public school students disciplined because of Internet use, it
was months before the school shootings in Littleton, Colorado
and the copycat incidents that have since occurred throughout
the country.1 Rightly or wrongly, the events in Littleton cre
ated a sense of urgency about the issue of student Internet use
because one of the student shooters had a Web site. That site
contained comments which, read with the benefit of hindsight,
seem to forecast his actions. 2 The discovery of the site
prompted renewed concern over student Internet use. 3
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A, 1970,
State University of New York at Stony Brook; J.D., 1973, Boston University; LL.M.,
1975, New York University. I would like to thank Karey Pond for her valuable assis
tance with this article and Howard Kalodner for his helpful comments on earlier drafts.
The research and writing of this article were supported by a research grant from West
ern New England College School of Law.
1. On April 20, 1999, two students, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, went on a
shooting spree in their suburban Denver high school killing fourteen students and one
faculty member and wounding at least twenty other students before killing themselves.
See Tom Kenworthy, A Day ofDeath and Fear in Colorado, WASH. PoST, Apr. 21, 1999,
at Al. A month later, in an Atlanta, Georgia suburb, a 15 year-old sophomore armed
with a rifle and a handgun shot and wounded six of his high school classmates. See Sue
Anne Pressley, 6 Wounded In Shooting at Georgia High School; Student Was Appar
ently Upset Over Breakup, WASH. POST, May 21, 1999, at Al.
2. Eric Harris had a Web site hosted by America Online (AOL). His Web site de
scribed how he used his paychecks to purchase fuses and ammunition. He also de
scribed acts of vandalism against his enemies. An earlier version of the site described
how Harris and Klebold made four pipe bombs. See Lorraine Adams & Cheryl W.
Thompson, Gunmen's Friends Focus of School Shooting Probe, WASH. POST, May 14,
1999, atAl.
3. By 11 P.M. on the day of the Littleton shootings, AOL deactivated Eric Harris'
account. See Linton Weeks, When Death Imitates Art; The Electronic Co-conspirator,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1999, at Cl. Subsequently, rumors spread about the role the
Internet played in the shootings. See id.. According to a CNN/USA Today/Gallop Poll,
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Thus far, school discipline of students for Internet use has
resulted in only one published judicial opinion. In Beussink v.
Woodland R-IV School District,4 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri issued a preliminary
injunction against the school district ordering it not to impose
any academic sanctions on a student who had created a Web
site that was critical of the school. Other instances of Internet
based student discipline have likewise resulted in settlements
in favor of student Internet users. 5 This first rash of cases re
sulting in reversals of school disciplinary decisions suggests
that schools have been quick to react to student Internet use by
imposing disciplinary sanctions without adequately considering
the scope of student free speech rights that apply to the Inter
net. This is possibly an overreaction which fails to take into ac
count the United States Supreme Court's decision in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union,6 a case which held that the
Internet was a fully-protected method of communication more
akin to print than to broadcast. 7
The interrelationship between the Internet and the First
Amendment rights of public school students is a complex topic.
The complexity persists partly because the Internet is not a
monolithic mode of communication. Internet service can be part
of a school's curriculum and can therefore entitle the school to
regulate access, much as the Supreme Court permitted in Ha
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 8 Alternatively, Internet
34% of those surveyed blamed the Internet a great deal for recent school shootings and
30% held the Internet responsible a moderate amount. See Poll: More parents worried
about school safety (poll taken Apr. 22, 1999) <http://cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/
1999/04/22/school.violence.poll/>.
4. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
5. At a high school near Cleveland, Ohio, a high school student was suspended
from school for ten days for insulting his band teacher on his Web site. After the stu·
dent filed suit and a judge issued a preliminary injunction directing the school to rein
state the student, the school agreed to settle the case and pay the student $30,000. See
Robyn Blumner, Censoring Students in Cyberspace, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 13,
1998, at 4D. In another case, a school suspended a student for a day and transferred
him out of a computer class because animal rights activists complained about his Web
site. After the ACLU intervened, the school expunged the discipline from his record
and allowed him to return to the class. See Evelyn Theiss & Kevin Harter, Access to
Web Lifts Lid from Student Expression, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 21, 1998, at lB.
6. 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down several provisions of the Communications
Decency Act).
7. See id. at 870.
8. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). For a discussion of Hazelwood, see infra notes 34-49 and
accompanying text.
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access can originate wholly outside the schoolhouse, yet have
serious repercussions within the school. Wherever the physical
location, student use of the Internet can involve a variety of
uses. A student can access material written by others, send or
receive e-mail, participate in a chat room or forum, or create
content that is posted to the school's official Web site or to the
student's own Web site. If the student is a content provider,
that content can be created on a computer available at school,
at home, or at some other location. Moreover, as in all free
speech cases, the exact content of the student's communication
will affect the outcome. Some student Internet speech, such as
true threats, may be outside the scope of First Amendment pro
tection altogether.
These myriad factual variations involving student Internet
use raise a wide range of speech questions, some that have ob
vious answers based on analogies to the non-Internet universe
of speech and others that have no clear answers even outside
the Internet context. Analysis is easiest when a computer
teacher instructs each student to create a Web site on comput
ers provided by the school. In that educational context, the
school is free to restrict the content of the site in order to avoid
types of speech that are inconsistent with the school's educa
tional objectives. It can also ban foul language, sexual refer
ences, insults, threats, and other offensive speech as a way of
furthering the lessons of civility that it wishes to teach
throughout its educational program.
Difficulties in free speech analysis arise as the speech
moves away from having a direct connection to the school's cur
riculum. This can occur where the student's Internet activities
make use of a facility provided by the school, such as its com
puter lab or its Internet server, but does not engage in the use
as part of a school-sponsored activity. For example, the school
could make its computer lab available to students after school
hours and allow them to use the lab's computers for personal
projects. Under such an arrangement, questions would arise
about the school's ability to discipline a student based on the
content of the student's Web site if the student created the Web
page at school and later arranged to have a commercial Inter
net service provider host it. In this situation, the school can
claim some connection to the creation of the site, but that con
nection involves neither supervision of the student's work nor
broadcast of the site. Such a hybrid situation makes it difficult
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to identify the proper First Amendment standard to use in re
viewing disciplinary action by the school.
Even more difficult questions are raised when the student's
Internet activities are completely disassociated from the school
environment. It is much less clear that the school's disciplinary
arm should be able to extend to a student's activities in his or
her home where the school does not provide any of the facilities
the student employs in making use of the Internet. Neverthe
less, it is easy to see why a school would argue that off-campus
Internet use can effect the atmosphere at school. If a student
posts a series of insulting messages directed at other students
at the school, the insulted students may be too embarrassed to
come to school or, even if they decide to attend, may be unable
to concentrate on their schoolwork.
In exploring the range of the First Amendment issues
raised by school efforts to discipline students for Internet ac
tivities, this article first will examine Supreme Court and lower
court precedent involving student speech outside of the Inter
net context. It will then look at Beussink, the first reported de
cision to involve discipline of a student for Internet speech. It
will also discuss other Internet situations in which schools
have sought to impose sanctions on students. In its final sec
tion, it will apply free speech methodology to a range of Inter
net situations. This exploration will identify some situations
where a school is free to control speech that it believes may
harm the school environment and others where the free speech
rights of students preclude school disciplinary action. For those
situations where there is no clear answer as to whose rights
are paramount, the article cannot provide firm answers, but
will at least raise some of the critical questions.

II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL
STUDENTSBEFORETHEINTERNET

The United States Supreme Court has decided a number of
cases involving the First Amendment claims of public school
students including Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu

nity School District, 9 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, lO

9. 393 u.s. 503 (1969).
10. 478 u.s. 675 (1986).
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and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 11 While these
cases have resolved some questions about the scope of student
rights and the power of public schools to ban certain types of
speech or punish students for various forms of expression, they
have left many questions unanswered with which the lower
courts are struggling. This section will look at these major Su
preme Court cases as well as several key lower court decisions
that raise issues analogous to questions likely to be raised
when public schools discipline students for their use of the
Internet.

A. United States Supreme Court Cases
United States Supreme Court rulings establishing the
framework within which to evaluate the First Amendment
claims of public school students have been the subject of much
commentary.1 2 Those cases, including the trilogy of Tinker,
Fraser and Hazelwood, create a confusing picture of students'
rights to free speech versus school officials' rights to discipline
students for that speech. This article will briefly review that
case law since it serves as a necessary backdrop to considera
tion of student rights of Internet speech, but it will leave a
more extensive consideration of the cases to others.
Thirty years ago the Supreme Court decided Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.13 The case
arose in the heated context of the Vietnam War. Mary Beth
Tinker and a group of other students agreed to participate in a
protest against the War by wearing black armbands to school.
The school authorities learned of the planned action and
adopted a rule banning the wearing of such armbands. Mter
Mary Beth and four other students wore their armbands to
school, the school acted quickly to suspend them.
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the Court
established for the first time that a public school building was
not off-limits to free speech rights by stating: "It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitu
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school

11. 484 u.s. 260 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Symposium, Tinker, Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Ex
pression, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 365 (1995).
13. 393 u.s. 503 (1969).
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house gate." 14 In light of its decision to recognize student ex
pressive rights, the Court imposed a significant burden on the
school to justify punishment of speech by demonstrating "that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and sub
stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate disci
pline in the operation of the school."' 15 Since there was little
evidence on which school authorities could have based a fore
cast of disruption, 16 or evidence that the students' behavior had
created any actual disruption in the school, 17 the Court held
that the school had not satisfied its burden. It was not constitu
tionally adequate for the school to rely on "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance." 18 Instead the school
needed evidence that such disruption had occurred or was
highly likely to occur, evidence which it did not have.
The Tinker case was important for several reasons. First,
its view of the educational process was that it was designed to
encourage the free exchange of ideas among students and not
one in which students should be treated as passive vehicles for
the reception of school-approved ideas. 19 Second, the Court im
posed a significant burden on the school to justify silencing
student speech despite the need for school authorities to exer
cise substantial control over students during the school day.
Third, despite the relatively young age of the students involved
in Tinker, 20 the Court recognized that the students had the
right to express controversial political ideas.
Tinker did not resolve all issues of student rights to free
dom of expression. Mary Beth Tinker had engaged in a speech
act that was, in the Court's words, "akin to 'pure speech."' 2 1 It
was dignified, silent, and involved no foul language or insult to
any particular individual. In addition, the school's evidence of
14. Id. at 506.
15. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
16. See id. at 509 n.3.
17. See id. at 508 "There is no indication that the work of the schools or any class
was disrupted. Outside the classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the
children wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school
premises." Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 511 ("In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.").
20. See id. at 504. At the time of the protest, John Tinker was 15 years old, Chris
topher Eckhardt was 16 years old and Mary Beth Tinker was a 13 year-old junior high
school student.
21. Id. at 508.
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disruption was meager at best and did not include any showing
that the armbands had interfered with the school's ability to
achieve its educational objectives. 22 Moreover, Mary Beth made
no use of school facilities for her personal act of self-expression
other than wearing the armband to school. The Court did not
make clear whether the rights it recognized would still exist if
some of the factual elements present in Tinker were missing.
The Court did not revisit directly the questions left open by
Tinker for more than fifteen years. 23 In 1986, the Court distin
guished Tinker when it decided Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser. 24 In Fraser, Matthew Fraser, a high school student,
was disciplined for a speech he gave nominating a classmate
who was a candidate for student government. The speech was
delivered at an official high school assembly in front of 600
students who ranged in age from fourteen to eighteen. The
speech Fraser gave included deliberate sexual innuendo and
provoked a wide range of reactions from those in the audience
including yelling, mimicry, bewilderment and embarrass

22. The only evidence of any reaction to the armbands was that a few students
made hostile remarks. See id. at 508. Moreover, the record made it clear that the deci
sion to expel students wearing armbands had been made in advance of their atten
dance at school and not as a result of actual reactions by other students. The school's
decision to adopt a rule banning the wearing of armbands to protest the Vietnam War
was not based on any specific knowledge of planned counter demonstrations, but in
stead relied on the general fact that strong opinions existed about the War. See id. at
509-10. This absence of any serious attempt at justification by the school district
meant that the Court did not need to look carefully at how difficult it would be for
schools in general to satisfy the Tinker standard. A contrary view of the adequacy of
the school's justification was expressed by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion. Jus
tice Black concluded that the armbands "took the students' minds off their classwork
and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam War."
Id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
23. While during this period the Supreme Court did not decide any cases involv
ing a public school's right to discipline one of its students for speech, it did decide sev
eral cases that raised First Amendment issues in an educational setting. In Papish v.
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam), the
Court overturned the expulsion of a graduate student for distributing a newspaper on
campus. The University had characterized the paper as containing "indecent speech,"
in violation of a University bylaw. See id. at 668 n.2. The Court rejected the Univer
sity's argument that it was free to regulate such speech and stated that "the mere dis
semination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university cam
pus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency."' Id. at 670. Nine
years after Papish, the Court considered the issue of under what circumstances a
school district's decision to remove books from a school library could violate the First
Amendment rights of students at the school. Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
24. 478 u.s. 675 (1986).
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ment.25 The day after the assembly, Fraser was notified that
he had violated a school disciplinary rule that prohibited
"'[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with
the educational process ... including the use of obscene, pro
fane language or gestures."' 26
Early in its opinion, the Court departed significantly from
the student autonomy theme it had emphasized in Tinker. In
stead, when describing the purpose of public education, the
Court stressed the need to "'prepare pupils for citizenship in
the Republic .... It must inculcate the habits and manners of
civility."'27 Civility, according to the Court, required that
"[e]ven the most heated political discourse in a democratic soci
ety requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the
other participants and audiences." 28 Moreover, qualifying its
holding in Tinker that students do not lose their constitutional
rights at the schoolhouse gate, in Fraser the Court stressed
that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings." 29 One of the distinctions between adults and children
stressed by the Court was the legitimacy of protecting minors
from exposure to vulgar language. These twin decisional prin
ciples, the validation of the school's role in teaching civilized
behavior and the lesser First Amendment rights of minors,
caused the Court to conclude that "schools, as instruments of
the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, ma
ture conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd,
indecent, or offensive speech and conduct."30
Fraser was distinguishable from Tinker on a number of
grounds. Unlike Mary Beth Tinker, Matthew Fraser was not
disciplined because he expressed a controversial political view
25. See id. at 678.
26. Id.
27. ld. at 681 (quoting from CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
28. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
29. ld. at 682. In making this distinction, the Court quoted with approval the
statement of Judge Newman in Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central
Sclwol District, 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring), who re
marked that "the First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to
wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket." The reference to Cohen's jacket re
ferred to Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the Supreme Court upheld
the right to protest the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket with the slogan "F- the
Draft" written across its back in the corridors of the Los Angeles County Courthouse.
30. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
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point. Moreover, Mary Beth did not express her viewpoint by
speaking at an assembly scheduled by the school administra
tion in connection with an official school activity. Further,
Mary Beth's wearing of her armband produced no discernible
reaction from her fellow students. In Fraser, students reacted
to the speech in a variety of ways including hooting and hol
lering, graphic gestures, embarrassment and bewilderment. 3l
Fraser's speech was even the subject of a discussion in one
class on the following day. 32 Finally, the school in Tinker
adopted a rule specifically banning the wearing of black arm
bands only after it learned of the scheduled antiwar protest
and before it knew whether the protest would cause any no
ticeable reaction. By contrast, Fraser's punishment followed
the reactions to his speech and was based on an existing school
rule.
These myriad distinctions make it possible to conclude that
Fraser and Tinker are not inconsistent with each other. How
ever, the Court did not rely specifically on most of these dis
tinctions in writing its opinion. The main theme stressed was
the inappropriateness of vulgar language in a school setting:
"Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school edu
cation to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in pub
lic discourse. Indeed, the 'fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system' disfavor the use
of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to oth
ers."33 While the Court distinguished the political speech in
31. See id. at 678.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 683. The distinction drawn by the Court between controversial political
ideas and vulgar and profane language had been critical in one earlier case arising in
the setting of a public school. In Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion), the Court affirmed a decision by the
Second Circuit overturning the district court's grant of summary judgment for the de
fendants in a case in which a school district was sued for removing a group of books
from its school libraries. To provide guidance to the district court on remand, the Court
focused on the reasons why the books had been removed. If the removal had been based
on the vulgar content of the books, such a removal would raise no First Amendment
issue. See id. at 871. By contrast, a plurality of the Court found unacceptable removal
decisions based on the political ideas contained in the books. Id. at 870-71. Since the
evidence did "not foreclose the possibility that petitioners' decision to remove the books
rested decisively upon disagreement with constitutionally protected ideas in those
books, or upon a desire on petitioners' part to impose upon the students of the Island
Trees High School and Junior High School a political orthodoxy," id. at 875, the Court
was unwilling to grant summary judgment in favor of petitioners. On the subject of
school library book removal, see Leora Harpaz, A Paradigm of First Amendment Di
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Tinker, it did not specifically rely on any of the other distinc
tions between the two cases. Moreover, the theme of individu
ality emphasized in Tinker was nowhere to be seen.
Two years after Fraser, the Court again returned to the
subject of the First Amendment rights of public school stu
dents. This time the context was the decision of a school princi
pal to censor several student-authored articles scheduled to be
printed in Spectrum, the school newspaper. In upholding the
censorship decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhl
meier, 34 the Court first considered the possibility that the
newspaper might be a public forum, thereby limiting the
school's ability to control the content of the paper. According to
the Court, "school facilities may be deemed to be public forums
only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened
those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general public' ...
or by some segment of the public, such as student organiza
tions."35 Examining the school's policy toward Spectrum, the
Court concluded that the newspaper had not been intended for
"indiscriminate use" by its students and was, therefore, not a
public forum. 36 Instead, the school's intent was to create "a su
pervised learning experience for journalism students."37
Since Spectrum was part of the school's curriculum, the
Court was once again able to distinguish Tinker. This time the
distinction was rooted in the fact that Tinker involved speech
that was the personal self-expression of the student and not
speech that occurred as part of an official school activity:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school
to tolerate particular student speech-the question that we
addressed in Tinker~is different from the question whether
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to pro
mote particular student speech. The former question adlemmas: Resolving Public School Library Censorship Disputes, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
1 (1981); Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest [o1·
the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527 (1984).
34. 484 u.s. 260 (1988).
35. Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
u.s. 37, 47 (1983)).
36. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270. The Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's deci
sion in Hazelwood. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986).
The Eighth Circuit had characterized Spectrum as a public forum. See id. at 1372.
Having decided that the Spectrum was a public forum, the court applied the Tinker
test to judge the constitutionality of the school's actions. See id. at 1374. The court con
cluded that the test was not satisfied. See id. at 1375.
37. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
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dresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal ex
pression that happens to occur on the school premises. The
latter question concerns educators' authority over school
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other ex
pressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school. These activities may fairly be characterized as
part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised
by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowl
edge or skills to student participants and audiences. 38

Since it lacked the characteristics of a public forum, the
Court was able to classify the publication of the school newspa
per as within this second category of school-sponsored speech. 39
The Court allowed school officials much greater control over
speech within this second category "to assure that participants
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that
readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be in
appropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of
the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school."4°These concerns go way beyond the ability of the school
to punish Tinker-type personal expression if it creates substan
tial disruption or interference with the rights of other stu
dents. 41 In this second category, the school newspaper can limit
the content of speech to exclude "speech that is, for example,
ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, bi
ased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for imma
ture audiences." 42 In its holding, the Court stressed that "edu
cators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."43
In applying these standards to the facts of Hazelwood, the
Court accepted as reasonable the principal's explanation for his
censorship of two articles. One article was about pregnant stu
dents and the principal worried that the students would be
38.
39.
40.
41.
(1969).
42.
43.

Id. at 270-71.
See id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 273.
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identifiable despite the fact their names were not used. The
ability to identify the students would violate the promise of
anonymity that had been made to the students and might in
volve invasion of the privacy interests of boyfriends and par
ents. 44 Interestingly, the Court expanded on the justifications
actually offered by the school to conclude that frank talk about
sexual activity leading to pregnancy could be viewed as unsuit
able in a school-sponsored publication. 45 The second article was
about divorce and included comments by a named student that
were critical of the student's father. The Court found that the
principal could have formed a reasonable belief that the article
did not satisfy the standards of journalistic fairness because
the parent was not given an opportunity to respond to the
comments. 46
In addition to distinguishing Tinker as involving personal
expression and not school-sponsored speech, the Court also re
ferred to Fraser. However, its efforts to classify Fraser were
more confusing than illuminating. Fraser became a pawn in an
argument between the majority and the dissent. The dissent
strongly argued that the distinction between personal expres
sion and school-sponsored speech was not a legitimate one and
had no grounding in earlier decisions of the Court. 47 In an ef
fort to support this argument, the dissent claimed that Fraser
applied the same standard as Tinker, reaching a different re
sult because Fraser's speech had a disruptive effect on its
young audience. 48 In a footnote, the majority responded to the
dissent's characterization of Fraser. Instead of accepting the
dissent's reliance on the disruption rationale, the majority
found "Fraser rested on the 'vulgar,' 'lewd,' and 'plainly offen
sive' character of a speech delivered at an official school assem
bly."49
This comment fails to eliminate either of two possible ex
planations for the majority's effort to distinguish Tinker and
Fraser. The first explanation is that Fraser involved school
sponsored speech delivered at an official school assembly and,
therefore, the school only had to satisfy the reasonableness test
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 274.
See id. at 274-75.
See id. at 275.
See id. at 282--89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. See d. at 281--82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 271 n.4.
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of Hazelwood, which it clearly could because of the lewd nature
of the speech. The second is that the personal expres
sion/school-sponsored dichotomy does not apply to vulgar and
lewd speech which can be prohibited in the school setting en
tirely. If this latter interpretation is the more accurate one, it
raises the issue of what other kinds of speech, distinguishable
from the dignified expression of a political viewpoint at issue in
Tinker, might also be inappropriate in the school setting.
These two plausible explanations create confusion as to the
proper interpretation of the Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood
trilogy. And they are not alone in creating such confusion.
While the Hazelwood Court goes to great lengths to preserve
Tinker, as the Court did earlier in Fraser, it is not clear what
remains of Tinker. The Hazelwood Court's statements about
the role of education in awakening students to "the shared val
ues of a civilized social order,"50 seem at odds with the Tinker
Court's characterization of education as training future leaders
through "robust exchange of ideas"5 1 and not through "authori
tative selection."52 With such fundamentally disparate views of
the goals of public education, reconciliation seems elusive. 53
Moreover, many questions remain unaddressed in the wake
of the Court's decisions. While its holdings place dignified, po
litical expression and sexual innuendo at the opposite ends of a
speech continuum, the Court gives no hint of where on that
continuum it would place speech that is insultingly critical of
teachers and school administrators. Further, the Court has not
determined the limits of key concepts such as "school-sponsored
activities" and "legitimate pedagogical concerns." Perhaps more
importantly, the Court has not spoken at all on the issue of
whether its decisions are limited to speech in the schoolhouse
50. Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986)).
51. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969)
(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
52. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943))).
53. More recently in Veronia School District, 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(upholding constitutionality against a Fourth Amendment challenge of school district
policy subjepting student athletes to random drug testing), the Court cited both Fraser
and Hazelwood with approval, noting that those cases had qualified its earlier state
ment in Tinker: "while children assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights ... at
the schoolhouse gate,' the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in
school." Id. at 655-56 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506) (internal citation omitted).
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or whether schools also have the ability to control off-campus
speech that could disrupt the school environment. These ques
tions and others that remain in the wake of Hazelwood have
not been resolved by the Supreme Court. It has been left to the
lower courts to struggle with some of these unresolved issues.

B. Lower Court Cases
This section will not review every case in which a lower fed
eral court has wrestled with the issues raised by Supreme
Court student speech rights precedent. 54 It will look selectively
at three categories of cases that grapple with key issues likely
to effect the treatment of student Internet speech. One category
of cases focuses on the reach of the Hazelwood concept of rea
sonable pedagogical objectives and whether a school can insu
late itself from student criticism under that guise. A second
category focuses on cases, like Tinker, where the speech at is
sue is the personal expression of the student and is unrelated
to any official school activity. The key difference between
Tinker and these cases is that the content of the speech at issue
differs from the classic political speech in Tinker. Given that
difference, the critical question is whether a school must never
theless satisfy the Tinker standard of "material and substantial
disruption." A third category involves speech that occurs off
school grounds, but which is nevertheless the subject of disci
plinary action. In this category, the key question is whether off
campus speech can be punished under the Tinker disruption
standard or whether the school must satisfy an even more
heightened standard.
1. The Reach of Hazelwood's Reasonableness Standard

In censoring articles in the school newspaper, the principal
in Hazelwood acted to protect students and members of their
families. Similarly, in Fraser, the school acted in the best inter
ests of its students to avoid speech that was improper for its
immature audience. In neither case did the school act to protect
itself from the sting of critical student comments. By contrast,
in Poling v. Murphy, 55 the Sixth Circuit struggled with how to
54. For a thorough examination of lower court applications of Hazelwood, see
Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student
Expression in the 1990's, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 379 (1995).
55. 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989).
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apply Hazelwood to student speech that contained insulting
comments about the school's assistant principal.
The facts of Poling are remarkably similar to Fraser in
terms of the circumstances of the student speech. In Poling,
Dean Poling was a candidate for president of the student coun
cil at his high school. Like other candidates, at a mandatory
assembly for all students at the high school, he was allowed to
give a speech encouraging students to vote for him. 56 Before
giving his speech, Dean was required to have it approved by
Mrs. Ollis, a faculty sponsor of the student council. Mrs. Ollis
asked Dean to change a reference to the school "administra
tion's iron grip," but allowed him to say that "[t]he administra
tion plays tricks with your mind."57 When giving his speech,
Dean eliminated the "iron grip" reference, but added a com
ment about the stuttering of Mr. Davidson, an assistant princi
pal at the high schooi.58 Ellis Murphy, the principal of the
school, found Dean's speech to be "'inappropriate, disruptive of
school discipline, and in bad taste."' 59 Mter consulting with
several faculty members, the principal declared Dean to be in
eligible to run for student council president.
In upholding the decision to discipline Dean Poling, the
Sixth Circuit characterized the school assembly at which he
spoke as a school-sponsored activity, in contrast to the situa
tion in Tinker. 60 The only issue to be resolved, according to the
court, was whether school officials acted to enforce "legitimate
pedagogical concerns." 61 The court first incorporated Fraser's
recognition of the need to teach "the shared values of a civilized
social order" into the range of Hazelwood's legitimate pedagogi
cal objectives, recognizing that such objectives can go beyond
academic teaching. 62 According to the court, "[t]he art of stat

56. See id. at 758.
57. !d. at 759.
58. In his speech, Dean Poling stated, "The administration plays tricks with your
mind and they hope you won't notice. For example, why does :Mr. Davidson stutter
while he is on the intercom? He doesn't have a speech impediment." Id. at 759. The
meaning of this remark was unclear to the court: "we are at a loss even to understand
the full significance of Dean Poling's reference to :Mr. Davidson's 'stutter.' (The affidavit
of :Mrs. Ollis says, without contradiction, that :Mr. Davidson does not stutter.)'' Id. at
761.
59. !d. at 759.
60. See id. at 762.
61. !d.
62. !d.
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ing one's views without indulging in personalities and without
unnecessarily hurting the feelings of others surely has a le
gitimate place in any high school curriculum."63 Giving great
deference to the judgment of local school administrators, the
court was unwilling to overturn the school's decision about the
proper balance between "independence of thought" and "disci
pline, courtesy and respect for authority."64
The Sixth Circuit panel did not reach a unanimous decision
in Poling. In his dissent, Judge Merritt disagreed with the
majority's reliance on Hazelwood. Instead, he found Tinker to
be the applicable precedent because Dean Poling's speech was
'"political speech,' pure and simple."65 Because Poling had
made a political speech in a forum created by the school for
such purposes, Judge Merritt believed that the school could
only discipline him for the content of his speech if it satisfied
Tinker's "substantial disruption" standard. According to Judge
Merritt, that standard could not be satisfied in Poling. While
the students in the audience cheered his speech, there was no
disruption of the assembly or any other school activities. 66
Judge Merritt ended his opinion with a rhetorical question: "If
the school administration can silence a student criticizing it for
being narrow minded and authoritarian, how can students en
gage in political dialogue with their educators about their edu
cation?"67
The Poling case raises the question of the reach of Hazel
wood's "legitimate pedagogical objectives." If defined broadly,
virtually any student speech occurring in the course of school
sponsored activities could be punished by the school. This
seems particularly objectionable in the context of a forum cre
ated by the school for the expression of the views of candidates
for student elective office where no clear academic principle is
at stake. While in Hazelwood, the school could tie its censor
ship of the school newspaper to the teaching of proper journal
istic behavior, 68 no similar relationship to curricular objectives
existed in Poling.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 763.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 765.
See id. at 766.
Id.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,

484 U.S. 260, 275 (1988).
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2. Personal Self-Expression Cases Without the Tinker Test
Several interesting examples of school decisions to punish
student speech that does not occur in the context of any official
school activity, thus falling within the Tinker category of per
sonal self-expression, are worth examining for the light they
shed on the reach of Tinker and its relationship to Fraser. One
such case is Pyle v. South Hadley School Committee. 69 In that
case, two high school students wore a series of T-shirts to test
the limits of the school's newly adopted dress code. The code
banned ''lewd, obscene or vulgar" clothing as well as clothes
that "harass, threaten, intimidate, or demean an individual or
group of individuals, because of sex, color, race, religion, handi
cap, national origin, or sexual orientation." 70 The school found
some of the T-shirts to violate its restriction on vulgar clothing.
Among the prohibited shirts were a series of "Coed Naked" T
shirts that contained logos such as "Coed Naked Band: Do It To
The Rhythm" and a T -shirt with the slogan "See Dick Drink.
See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't Be A Dick." T-shirts with
"political" messages, such as "Coed Naked Civil Liberties: Do It
To The Amendments" 71 and "Coed Naked Censorship-They
Do It In South Hadley," were permitted by the school.
In reviewing a First Amendment challenge to the school
dress code, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts examined the relevant Supreme Court prece
dents, focusing particularly on the relationship between Tinker
and Fraser. The court concluded that the Tinker test of mate
rial and substantial disruption did not apply to vulgar speech,
even if that speech did not take place at an official school func
tion like the school assembly in Fraser. 72 According to Pyle, the
school has an absolute right to prohibit '"vulgar' or plainly of

69. 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994), vacated, 55 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995) (court of
appeals deferred ruling on federal constitutional question addressed by district court
and certified question of state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court).
70. ld. at 162. Under the code, the school also banned clothing that "[a]dvertises
alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, or illegal drugs." It permitted clothes that ex
pressed political viewpoints "as long as the views are not expressed in a lewd, obscene
or vulgar manner."
71. ld. at 162-63. Several school administrators originally concluded that the
"Coed Naked Civil Liberties" shirt violated the dress code, a view that was confirmed
by the school committee. The principal later decided that it did not violate the dress
code.
72. See id. at 166.
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fensive speech (Fraser-type speech)." 73 So long as the school
does not attempt to ban a message on aT-shirt because of the
viewpoint it expresses, as opposed to the manner of expression,
the school does not have to satisfy the Tinker standard.
While accepting the ban on vulgarity as governed by Fraser,
the court took a different view of the harassment provision.
The harassment provision in the code was viewed as "aimed di
rectly at the content of the speech, not at its potential for dis
ruption or its vulgarity."7 4 The court found such a general pro
hibition to be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota. 75 Under the holding of
Tinker, the Pyle court did allow the school to ban particular
demeaning clothing if the school "reasonably concluded that
the message would cause a substantial and material disruption
to the daily operations of the school." 76 However, the general
prohibition in the current dress code was found to be unconsti
tutional.
Similar conclusions have been reached by other courts. In
Chandler v. McMinnville School District, 77 two students wore
various buttons and stickers to school to support striking
teachers and to oppose the school's hiring of replacement
teachers. 78 One of the buttons had the word "Scabs" printed on
it with a line drawn through the word. Another said "I'm not
listening scab." The stickers stated "Scab we will never forget."
The students were asked to remove all buttons and stickers
with the word "scab" on the grounds that they were "offensive"
and "inherently disruptive."
In reaching its decision to overturn the district court's dis
missal of the students' complaint, the Ninth Circuit, broadly
73. ld.
74. ld. at 171.
75. 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down St. Paul ordinance banning certain types
of hate speech). Courts have also struck down university speech codes that ban hate
speech. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central :Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. :Mich. 1993),
affd, 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University of :Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852
(E.D. :Mich. 1989). See also Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason
Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
76. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 173 (D. Mass. 1994).
77. 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Broussard v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 801
F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992) (upholding suspension of student for wearing shirt that
had the words "Drugs Suck" on the front and that was considered by the school to be
offensive).
78. Chandler, 978 F.2d at 526.
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interpreting Fraser, concluded that public schools "may sup
press speech that is vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive
without a showing that such speech occurred during a school
sponsored event or threatened to 'substantially interfere with
[the school's] work."'79 By contrast, other speech that does not
occur in the context of a school-sponsored event must satisfy
the Tinker disruption standard. Despite this broad interpreta
tion of Fraser, the court was unwilling to give public schools
unlimited discretion to classify speech as falling within the
Fraser category. Taking into account the recognized use of the
word "scab" in labor disputes, the court was "satisfied that
these buttons cannot be considered per se vulgar, lewd, ob
scene, or plainly offensive within the meaning of Fraser. At this
stage in the litigation, the school officials have made no show
ing that the word 'scab' reasonably could be so considered."80
The court also concluded that the buttons were not "inherently
disruptive" under Tinker,81 but took no position on whether, on
remand, the school would be able to prove "facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities." 82
A second type of speech that has also been excluded from
the reach of Tinker is the category of threats. In Lovell v.
Poway Unified School District, 83 a high school student was
suspended for allegedly threatening to shoot a guidance coun
selor if the counselor did not make requested changes to the
student's schedule. The case was complicated by the fact that
there was a conflict in testimony as to what the student actu
ally said to the counselor. The counselor's version had the stu
dent uttering a "true threat," a category of speech not protected
by the First Amendment.84 The student's version was that she
79. Id. at 529 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 509 (1969)). This broad view of Fraser was not shared by Judge Goodwin in
his concurring opinion. In Judge Good\vin's view, a critical element in Fraser was the
fact that he gave a public speech before a captive audience. See id. at 531-32 (Good
win, J., concurring).
80. Chandler, 978 F.2d at 530.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 529 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
u.s. 503, 514 (1969)).
83. 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
84. According to the guidance counselor, Sarah Lovell said, "If you don't give me
this schedule change I'm going to shoot you." Id. at 369 n.l. The court interpreted this
to be a "true threat" under the Supreme Court's holding in Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705 (1969), a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment: ''What is a
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generally expressed her feelings by saying that she was so an
gry she could shoot someone, but that she never specifically
mentioned the counselor in her statement.85 To resolve this
dispute in testimony, the court relied on the burden of proof.
The court concluded that the student had the burden of proving
that her First Amendment rights were violated. 86 Since "true
threats" are not protected by the First Amendment, the student
had to prove she had not uttered a true threat. Since the evi
dence was in equipoise as to what was said, the student failed
to carry her burden.87
These cases identify several important varieties of speech
that can be punished by a school even if the student's com
ments are not part of a school-sponsored activity and even if
the school can produce no evidence of disruption or other inter
ference with its educational program. Both circumstances are
likely to be significant in the context of the Internet.
3. Off-campus Speech
The third category of case arises where the student speech
occurs off-campus, but where the school nonetheless disciplines
the student. This situation has not arisen in any of the Su
preme Court cases reviewing public school student discipline in
the face of First Amendment challenges. In fact, the clear in
ference to be drawn from the Court's cases is that it is assum
ing the school's authority over the speech of its students ends
as the student leaves the schoolhouse. 88 To overcome this in
ference, schools attempt to link the off-campus speech to some
threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech." Id. at
707. In interpreting Watts, the court relied on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision defin
ing a "true threat:" "whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm or assault." United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903
F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990). Using the Orozco-Santillan definition, the court con
cluded that the student had uttered a "true threat" if the student's words were the ones
reported in the guidance counselor's version of the facts. See LoL•ell, 90 F.3d at 372.
85. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 369.
86. See id. at 373.
87. See id.
88. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), the Court
coined its oft-quoted statement that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506. This statement draws a distinction between the rights of
students outside of school and their treatment while in school, suggesting that their
rights are greater while they are away from school.
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on-campus event; either the speech reaches the campus
through some means or the off-campus speech has some effect
on-campus.
Some of the cases in this category involve fact patterns that
allow the school to show some presence of the speech on
campus. For instance, an underground newspaper may have
been written away from school, but copies are distributed at
school. The school, therefore, can attach its disciplinary action
to the on-campus behavior of distribution. An example of this
kind of on-campus connection to off-campus speech occurred in
Donovan v. Ritchie. 89 In Donovan, fifteen high school students
met in one of the students' homes and someone created a
document called "The Shit List." It listed 140 students with a
crude, insulting comment following each name on the list. The
comments focused on personal appearance, behavior or sexual
conduct. Several days later, three students made photocopies of
the list and arranged to have the copies delivered to school. Af
ter the principal saw the list and identified the students in
volved in its distribution, 90 they were suspended for 10 days for
violation of several school rules prohibiting harassment and
obscene language. 91
Another example of punishment for off-campus speech oc
curred in Boucher v. School Board of the School District of
Greenfield. 92 In Boucher, a school district expelled a high
school student who authored an article in an underground
newspaper that was distributed on-campus. The article pro
vided information about how to hack into the schoofs comput
ers. Although Boucher wrote the article, there was no evidence
that he had participated in the on-campus distribution of the
paper. Boucher sued claiming that the school had violated his
free speech rights under the federal and state constitutions and
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of
the expulsion order.
89. 68 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995).
90. See id. at 16. The principal also met with all 15 students who had been pres
ent when the list was created and their parents. At that meeting, he expressed his view
that the list violated the school's rules. The opinion does not indicate whether all 15
were disciplined in any fashion.
91. See id. at 17. The First Circuit review of the case did not consider any First
Amendment challenge to the discipline. Instead, the issues before the court related to
whether the student's due process rights were violated by the procedures employed in
imposing the suspension. The court concluded they were not.
92. 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998).
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Vacating the district court's grant of preliminary injunctive
relief, the Seventh Circuit's opinion focused in part on issues
relevant to the grant of preliminary injunctive relief and not
related to the First Amendment issue on the merits. However,
because one of the criteria for preliminary injunctive relief was
the likely outcome on the merits, the court considered the free
speech claim raised by Boucher. One of Boucher's arguments
was "that school officials' authority over off-campus expression
is much more limited than it is over expression on school
grounds."93 Boucher argued that his speech should be analyzed
under the test in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 94 a test designed for
use outside the school environment to evaluate the protected
status of speech advocating lawless action. 95 Boucher claimed
that his speech was protected under the Brandenburg test and
that the school should not be permitted to punish him based on
any lesser standard, including the Tinker disruption test.
The issue raised by Boucher is the critical question about
off-campus speech. One view is that the school should only be
able to punish the speech if it could be punished under tradi
tional free speech analysis and not under the lesser standards
applicable in the special environment of the public school. The
other view is that the speech should be reviewed under the
Tinker test. So long as school officials can "forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities" or
show that "disturbances or disorders on the school premises in
fact occurred," they should be able to punish the speech.96 The
Seventh Circuit resolved this issue in favor of the use of the
Tinker test. It was able to reach this conclusion because the
speech was distributed at school, although not by Boucher, and
because the speech advocated an on-campus activity. 97 Given
the destructive potential of the information contained in the ar
ticle, the school could easily prove that the speech would create
93. See id. at 828.
94. 395 u.s. 444 (1969).
95. Id. at 447. Under the Brandenburg test, speech can be punished only "where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action." Id. It is possible that Boucher's article could satisfy
this test because the article was more than the neutral provision of information about
how to accomplish unauthorized access to the schoofs computers. Instead, the article,
at least, advocated illegal behavior and provided such specific instructions that it was
likely that its instructions would be followed.
96. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
97. See Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829.
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the material disruption of school functions required by Tinker.
In another case involving discipline of a student for off
campus speech, the student plaintiff was more successful in
convincing the court that his First Amendment rights had been
violated. In Klein v. Smith, 98 a student gave one of his teachers
the finger when he encountered him in a restaurant parking
lot. The student sued after being suspended for 10 days for
violating a school rule that prohibits "'vulgar or extremely in
appropriate language or conduct directed to a staff member."'99
The United States District Court for the District of Maine over
turned the suspension because it found that the relationship
between the student's vulgar gesture while away from school
and the operations of the school was "too attenuated to support
discipline" of the student. 100 Nevertheless, the court's opinion
makes clear that it would have upheld the suspension, just as
in Boucher, if the court had found the off-campus activity ma
terially disrupted the work of the school.
III. SCHOOL DISCIPLINE OF STUDENTS FOR INTERNET USE

While only one federal district court has thus far issued a
published opinion in a public school Internet case, newspapers
have reported on a large number of situations in which schools
have disciplined students whose misconduct involved use of the
Internet to disseminate material they had written. This section
will discuss both Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District10 1
and a number of other reported incidents.
A. The Federal Courts Tackle Their First School Internet
Disciplinary Case: Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District
In December, 1998, a federal court for the first time issued
a decision in a case involving a public high school's discipline of
a student based on the student's use of the Internet. The deci

98. 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986).
99. Id. at 1441.
100. Id. The court also rejected two arguments intended to deprive the student's
gesture of any First Amendment protection. It refused to find that the gesture lacked a
"communicative purpose or expressive content and is, therefore, not 'speech' entitled to
First Amendment protection." Id. at n.2. It also dismissed an argument that the speech
could be classified as "fighting words" and, therefore, not protected by the First
Amendment. See id. at 1442 n.3.
101. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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sion was a victory for student Internet rights and a defeat for
the schoofs disciplinary efforts. 102 In Beussink v. Woodland R
IV School District, 103 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri issued a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the schoofs discipline of the student pending a decision
on the merits of the case. In the circumstances of the case, the
court rejected the schoofs effort to justify its discipline of the
student and upheld the student's right to freedom of expres
sion.
The Beussink litigation arose because Brandon Beussink
created a Web site and posted it on the Internet. The site was
created on his own computer and not a computer at the high
school. The connection between the Web site and the high
school was that the content of the site was very critical of the
school and included criticism of the school principal, teachers
at the school and the high schoofs own Web site. That criticism
was expressed in vulgar language. The site also contained a
link to the schoofs site. Beussink did not display the site to
students at school, however, a friend of his found out about the
site when she used his home computer. Beussink's friend was
angry at him, and in order to retaliate against him, she ac
cessed the site at school and showed it to the schoofs computer
teacher. The computer teacher went to the principal and to
gether they viewed the site on a computer in the schoofs com
puter lab. After viewing the Web site, the principal immedi
ately made the decision to discipline Beussink.104
In considering whether Beussink was likely to succeed on
the merits of his case, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Tinker. Using the Tinker standard of material and
substantial interference, the court found that the principal had
made the decision to discipline Beussink immediately after
viewing his Web site solely as a result of his offense at its con
102. The decision was not a victory on the merits of the case. The case came before
the court at a preliminary stage when the student sought a preliminary injunction pre
venting the school from enforcing its disciplinary sanctions against him during the
pendency of the case. However, because one of the criteria for the grant of preliminary
injunctive relief is the likelihood of success on the merits, the court's decision was in
large part based on its consideration of the First Amendment rights of the student as
contrasted with the schoofs disciplinary authority.
103. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
104. See id. at 1179. Later in the day, the principal sent Beussink a disciplinary
notice suspending him from school for five days. After reconsidering the length of his
suspension, the principal later increased the length of his suspension to ten days.
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tent and not because there had been any material disruption
resulting from the Web site or because the principal had a rea
sonable basis for fearing such disruption.105 According to the
court, "[d]isliking or being upset by the content of a student's
speech is not an acceptable justification for limiting student
speech under Tinker."106
In addition to finding that Beussink's speech was not dis
ruptive as required by the Tinker standard, the court also ap
peared to classify the speech as fully protected speech despite
its use of foul language, a category of speech courts have per
mitted schools to sanction.107 The court categorized Beussink's
speech as "provocative and challenging" and, therefore, "most
in need of the protections of the First Amendment." 108
The court did not explain why it found Tinker to be the
relevant precedent. However, it did classify the speech at issue
as "[s]tudents' personal expressions which happen to take place
on school property," as contrasted to speech sponsored by the
school which would be analyzed according to the more restric

105. See id. at 1180.
106. Id. In addition to finding that Beussink was likely to succeed on the merits of
his action, the court also found that the other factors relevant to a decision whether to
grant preliminary injunctive relief weighed in his favor. Beussink suffered a threat of
irreparable injury not only because his First Amendment rights were violated, but also
because the discipline had the potential to delay his date of graduation due to the
schoofs use of unexcused absences to reduce the grades students received in their
courses. See id. at 1181. Moreover, the court viewed the harm that would be suffered by
Beussink if it refused to grant a preliminary injunction as vastly outweighing the harm
to the school if preliminary relief was granted. Since the school suffered no harm to
school discipline and no disruption of the education it provided, the court was able to
conclude that there would be no harm to the school. See id. Indeed, the court suggested
that the principafs decision to discipline Beussink may have been influenced less by
his Web site and more by other behavior Beussink had engaged in prior to the Web in
cident, but for which he had only received a mild sanction. See id. Finally, the court
concluded that the public interest would be served by protecting the right to dissemi
nate ideas. See id. at 1181-82.
107. See, e.g., Broussard v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D.
Va. 1992), interpreting Fraser to allow the school to ban offensive language even if that
language is not sexual in nature: "Speech need not be sexual to be prohibited by school
officials; speech that is merely lewd, indecent, or offensive is subject to limitation." Id.
at 1536.
108. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. In reaching this conclusion, the court
quoted from the Supreme Court's decision in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949): "One of the core functions of free speech is to invite dispute. 'It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative
and challenging."' Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1181-82 (quoting Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
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tive standard of Hazelwood. 109 In describing this dichotomy,
the court did not offer any reasons why it considered the speech
to have taken place on school property. In looking at that ques~
tion, however, it is useful to note the connections that existed
between the speech and the school. First, and most obviously,
the school was the subject of the speech. Second, Beussink's
Web site contained a hyperlink to the school's Web site. In ad~
dition, the site was seen by the computer teacher and the prin~
cipal in the school's computer lab after it was accessed by
Beussink's classmate. Indeed, the principal testified that "he
was upset that the homepage's message had been displayed in
one of his classrooms." 11 Further, there was evidence that
later that same day other students learned of the site and ac~
cessed it in the computer lab with the permission of the com~
puter teacher. 111 Moreover, there was disputed testimony by
the school librarian that Beussink accessed the site on a library
computer on the same day it was seen by the principal.112
However, the librarian did not claim Beussink showed the site
to other students. Finally, there was testimony in the case that
after he received his suspension notice, Beussink showed a
copy of the site to his civics teacher for advice on whether he
could be disciplined based on its content.113
Other than the disputed incident in the school library, none
of the displays of the site on the school's computers came about
because of Beussink's own actions. In that sense, what hap~
pened is no different than if he wrote a story critical of the
school in his room at home and that story was taken from his
room by a fellow student without his permission and shown to
the school principal. It is hard to see how Beussink can be
blamed for the presence of his Web site on the school's comput~
ers when he did nothing to facilitate its display and was un~
aware that it would be displayed at school. Indeed, Beussink
never gave the address of his Web site to any other student, it
was only discovered accidentally by a friend who visited his

°

109. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 n.4.
110. Id. at 1178.
111. See id. at 1179.
112. See id. at 1178. This testimony was denied by both Beussink and Amanda
Brown, the friend who disclosed the existence of the site when she displayed it for the
computer teacher.
113. See id. at 1179. There was a dispute in the testimony as to the source of the
copy that Beussink showed his teacher. He claimed the copy was attached to the disci·
plinary notice. The school secretary denied that a copy was included with the notice.
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home. 114
Nevertheless, the ubiquitous-ness of the Internet may have
influenced the principal's actions. Beussink's behavior in cre
ating the story was different from the behavior of a student
writing at home because of the universality of posting his
writing to a Web site. Beussink's dissemination of his vitriol
against the school could have been seen, both from computers
at the school as well as computers at other locations, by every
student, teacher and administrator at the school as well as
countless others not connected to the school. Though there is no
way to know whether the nature of Beussink's distribution of
his attack on the school fueled the principal's strong reaction to
his conduct and resulted in immediate discipline of Beussink, it
would not be surprising if this was at least a contributing fac
tor.
Beussink is an interesting beginning for the courts' foray
into the subject of student Internet speech. It applies the tradi
tional dichotomy between student personal expression and
school-sponsored speech, relying as it does on the Tinker test of
material disruption. In that sense, it breaks no new ground and
does not create a new law of the Internet. On the other hand, it
appears to allow the attributes of the Internet, particularly the
irrelevance of physical location, to break down the barriers be
tween speech at school and speech at home.

B. Other Examples of Internet-Based Student Discipline
While Beussink is the only student Internet case to result in
a published opinion, many other examples of school discipline
for Internet activities have been reported in the media. The
student Internet cases include a range of content from threats

114. It is interesting to compare Beussink's actions to the facts in Boucher v.
School Board of the School District of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998). For a
discussion of Boucher, see supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. In Boucher, the
school disciplined the writer of an article in an underground student newspaper, even
though he had not participated in the distribution of the paper at school. The connec
tions between Boucher's actions and on-campus events were that the paper was dis
tributed at school and the article gave instructions about how to hack into the school's
computer system. This is similar to the connections in Beussink since his Web site was
viewed at school and his site criticized school personnel. However, the writer in
Boucher, unlike Beussink, at least participated in an enterprise which he had reason to
know would result in distribution of the paper to students at school. Beussink had no
such knowledge because he had no reason to believe his Web site would be discovered
by any other student.
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and insults directed at students and teachers to sophomoric
humor directed at animals. In addition, they involve an array
of connections between the school and the communication.
Some of these Internet situations have resulted in the filing of
lawsuits, several of which the schools involved have been quick
to settle. ll5 This section will review some examples of such
Internet-based discipline.
One of the most widely publicized examples of student dis
cipline arising from use of the Internet occurred in McKinney,
Texas. The incident began when thirteen-year-old Aaron Smith
made a drawing in the Dowell Middle School computer lab as
part of a slide presentation for a school project.116ffis friends
decided the drawing looked like a Chihuahua and, as a spoof,
Aaron and his friends formed a club, the Chihuahua Haters of
America. Aaron eventually turned the drawing into the begin
ning of a Web site he designed on his home computer. The Web
site was called CHOW which stood for Chihuahua Haters of the
World. It contained humorous attacks on Chihuahuas.
The CHOW Web site came to the attention of a Chihuahua
breeder who contacted Aaron and the superintendent of the
public school system in McKinney, Texas. The Chihuahua
breeder threatened to stage an animal-rights protest if the
school did not take action. The superintendent eventually re
ceived 50 e-mails protesting the site.l 17 Aaron and other club
members were called to the principal's office and were disci
plined for "'creating a Web page implicating a Dowell animal
hate group."' 118 Aaron's discipline included removal from his
Emerging Technology class and a one-day suspension for re
fusing to delete his Web site. The ACLU intervened on Aaron's
behalf and he was reinstated into his computer class and the
disciplinary action was expunged from his record. 119
Aaron Smith's story demonstrates the power of the Internet
to distribute information widely and to reach people who are
most likely to react strongly to what they see and read. It is
unlikely the school would have decided to discipline Aaron un
115. See supra note 5.
116. See Tracey Cooper, Boy's Pet Web Page Spoof Comes Back to Bite Him,
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Mar. 7, 1998, atA11.
.
117. See New York Times Service, Schools Challenge Freedom of Cyberspeech,
SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL, Mar. 8, 1998, at 19A.
118. Cooper, supra note 116 (quoting from the school's disciplinary report).
119. See Theiss & Harter, supra note 5.
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less a McKinney school system official had been contacted by
Chow breeders and animal rights activists. The only connec
tions between Aaron's Web site and his school were that the
genesis for the CHOW idea was a project Aaron did for school
and that his Web site referred to the fact that the site had
evolved from his Dowell Middle School computer lab project.
The site was not linked to any Web site maintained by the
school nor did it suggest it was an official site of the school.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe Aaron's site would have
disrupted activities at his school. The site did not threaten or
insult students or teachers and did not contain vulgarity. In
addition, even though its subject was a satiric look at Chihua
huas and not a more weighty political topic, it clearly fell
within the category of fully protected expression. Despite all
these reasons not to take any action, his school decided to dis
cipline Aaron and did not reverse its decision until after the in
tervention of the ACLU.
At the opposite extreme of Aaron Smith's CHOW site are a
variety of student Internet cases where students make threats
of violence directed at the school, other students or teachers.
For example, in Pennsylvania, a Quakertown Community High
School student was disciplined for posting on his Web site the
names of two teachers and two classmates on a list of people
who should be shot. 12 Criminal charges for making terroristic
threats were also brought against the student by the Bucks
County district attorney. 121 In another incident in Pennsylva
nia, the Bethlehem School Board expelled a student who used
his Web site to solicit funds to hire a hitman to murder his
mathematics teacher. 122 A second student was expelled for
using the same site to threaten his German teacher.
Cases similar to these have proliferated in the aftermath of
the Littleton, Colorado shootings. One recent example occurred
in Wilbraham, Massachusetts, where the principal of Min
nechaug Regional High School recently announced it was likely
the school would take disciplinary action against a sophomore
who used his mother's account to gain access to a Web site

°

120. See Lawrence C. Hall,
CALL, Sept.ll, 1998, at Bl.

Internet Threats Punished, ALLENTOWN MORNING

121. , See id. at n. 120.
122. See Kathleen Parrish, Expelled Web-Threat Teens
ALLENTO\VN MORNING CALL, Sept. 2, 1998, at B3.

Change Schools,
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sponsored by the Massachusetts Department of Education.123
Using the account, he participated in an on-line discussion
about the murders at Columbine High School, posting several
threatening messages in the course of the discussion. 124 Ac
cording to a newspaper account of the case, he commented that
"if I had been planning for a year, had shotguns and semi
autos, in a crowded caf-library, I could have taken down a [ex
pletive] of a lot more than 15" and threatened another student
who he claimed had called him a "geek." 125 He reportedly said
of the student, "I told her to 'watch out, I might gun you down
someday' and the little bitch was really scared!" 126
In between humor about dead Chihuahuas and threats of
violence are cases in which students and teachers are ridiculed,
as in Beussink. One other example occurred as a result of Sean
O'Brien's Web site. Sean was a seventeen year-old student at a
school near Cleveland, Ohio. His Web site poked fun at his
band teacher whose picture was included on the site and who
was described on the site as "an overweight middle-age man
who doesn't like to get haircuts." Sean was suspended from
school for ten days and threatened with expulsion if he didn't
remove the material from his site. Sean filed suit and a judge
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the
school from carrying out its disciplinary sanctions. Soon after
the issuance of the TRO, the school district settled the suit and
agreed to apologize to Sean and pay him $30,000.
While most of the reported incidents involve punishment
for creating and broadcasting Internet content, there are excep
tions. For example, Mikey Driscoll, an eleven-year-old student
in Santa Barbara, California, was suspended for one day and
lost his Internet privileges for one month because he viewed a
Web site that displayed a picture of a naked woman from a
computer terminal in the school library. 127 The discipline oc
curred because the screen display was spotted by a teacher
123.

See Joseph Mallia, Mass. Student Taken to Task for Implied Internet Threats,
May 14, 1999, at 16.
124. See Joseph Mallia, Federal, Local Officials Eye Threats Via State E-mail,
BOSTON HERALD, May 13, 1999, at 6.
125. Mallia, supra note 123.
126. Mallia, supra note 124.
127. See John Schwartz, Lessons in Policing Online Porn Access at School, WASH.
POST, May 12, 1997, at F19. The site was accessed by a friend of the boy who typed in
the Internet address of the site, saying, ''I want to show you something" without re
vealing the contents in advance. Id. The friend was disciplined as well. Id.
BOSTON HERALD,
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walking through the library. The school originally put a nota
tion on the boy's record that he was suspended for "pornogra
phy." Eventually, the school changed the listed offense to "In
appropriate Use of the Internet."
Beussink and the other situations described, from Aaron
Smith's sophomoric humor to death threats directed at teach
ers and students to Mikey Driscoll's "naked lady," 128 indicate
the wide range of Internet speech that has resulted in disci
pline of public school students. Many, but not all, of these cases
involve speech with content that would frighten most reason
able school officials, but which would be protected by the First
Amendment if uttered by adults outside of a school setting.
Most of the cases involve speech that does not occur at school,
except by an unreasonable stretch of the imagination.

IV. FREE SPEECH METHODOLOGY AS APPLIED TO STUDENT
INTERNET USE

Student rights of expression vary with three elements: (1)
whether the speech can be categorized as school-sponsored or
the personal expression of the student; (2) the content of the
speech; and (3) whether the speech occurs on or off school
grounds. These dividing lines are made reasonably clear by the
Supreme Court cases involving student speech rights and the
lower court cases interpreting them. This section will examine
a wide array of student Internet speech situations and apply
First Amendment principles as discerned from Tinker, Fraser,
Hazelwood and their progeny to those situations.

A. School-sponsored activities
The one situation where a public school is undisputably free
to ban a wide array of expression is in the context of school
sponsored activities. Under the rationale of Hazelwood, a
school could impose all reasonable restrictions on student
speech in a computer class. This could probably preclude lewd
ness, offensiveness, vulgarity, insults, threats and other speech
that is inconsistent with the values of civility and community

128. When Mikey Driscoll was interviewed on CBS This Morning, he was asked,
"What did you see on the screen." He replied, "I saw a naked lady-a-picture of it."
CBS This Morning: Santa Barbara Student Punished for Visiting Pornographic Sites
on the Internet (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 20, 1997).

154

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2000

that a school could choose to impart to its students. It is likely
that even Aaron Smith's humorous attack on Chihuahuas could
be viewed as inconsistent with the educational goals of the
school if his work had been done in the context of an academic
activity. The school would, of course, be required to satisfy the
due process requirement of notice in defining the range of un
acceptable speech even in the context of a school-sponsored ac
tivity, but courts have been willing to accept broadly worded
standards as sufficient to inform students of the kinds of
speech that are proscribed.129
One issue yet to be considered is whether there are any
limits on the concept of school-sponsored speech as it applies to
the Internet. It is easy to conclude that a computer class is
school-sponsored. 130 On the other hand, some schools make
computer labs available for student use during non-classroom
hours. Increasingly, computers in school computer labs will be
connected to the Internet. While such a lab is a school facility,
that does not necessarily mean that all use of the lab is school
sponsored. Mter all, the Hazelwood concept of school-sponsored
activities distinguishes between designated public forums, op
portunities that the school creates to encourage the personal
expression of its students, 131 and speech that is under the con
trol of the school and serves school-dictated goals.132 Several
examples of decisions recognizing the existence of public fo
rums within a school are key to understanding this distinction.
While these cases arise in the context of universities and not
primary and secondary schools, they are still worth consider
ing.133
129. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) ("Given the
schoors need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unantici
pated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need
not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.").
130. The school-sponsored designation has also been attached to various school
extracurricular activities, McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 359777 (E.D.
Mo. April 27, 1999) (a marching band's performances); Jager v. Douglas County Sch.
Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989) (football games); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of
Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (dramatic productions). Even attendance by a stu
dent at an athletic event participated in by a team from the student's school, but held
at another school, has been considered to be school sponsored. See e.g., Pirschel v. Sor
rell, 2 F. Supp. 2d 930 (E.D. Ky. 1998). But see Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist.,
1999 WL 342467 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1999) (card game played by extracurricular club on
school grounds after school hours was not endorsed by the school).
131. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
132. See id. at 271.
133. Whether cases involving the rights of students at colleges and universities are
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In Widmar v. Vincent, 134 the Supreme Court declared the
university classroom a public forum for student groups to use
as meeting places, when the classrooms were not otherwise in
use_l35 As a designated public forum, the university could not
exclude a group from the use of university space on the basis of
the content of the group's speech unless the university could
satisfy the most demanding level of First Amendment scru
tiny.136 If allowing a student to use a school's computer lab to
access the Internet when the lab is not being used for academic
purposes is akin to making classroom space available, then the
school may not be free to limit student use of the Internet in
the same fashion as it can limit school-sponsored speech.
Another example of a university public forum possibly rele
vant to the computer lab is found in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia. 137 In Rosenberger, the
University provided financial assistance to publications
authored by student groups. A student group sued the Univer
sity when it refused to fund its magazine because it promoted
Christian values. The Court held that the university fund, even
though not a physical space like most public forums, was still a
forum for First Amendment purposes.138 As a public forum, the
University could not make viewpoint-based distinctions about
which publications it would fund. 139 The one control that the
University could impose was to require that student publica
tions not appear to be official University publications. Howequally applicable to younger students attending public schools is far from clear. The
Court in Hazelwood left unresolved the issue of whether its willingness to defer to the
judgment of school officials would be equally "appropriate with respect to school·
sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level." Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 273-74 n.7. Certainly, later statements of the Court about the nature of uni
versities seem inconsistent with the characteristics the Court ascribed to the public
school education system in Hazelwood: "For the University, by regulation, to cast dis
approval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech
and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectual life, its col
lege and university campuses." Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515
u.s. 819, 836 (1995).
134. 454 u.s. 263 (1981).
135. See id. at 267. Widmar makes clear that a single facility can be a public forum
at some times, but not at others. Accord Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (school auditorium). Thus, the computer lab need not be
given a unitary characterization for all of its uses.
136. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
137. 515 u.s. 819 (1995).
138. See id. at 830.
139. See id. at 832.
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ever, since student organizations were required to include a
disclaimer in their publications making clear that the views
expressed were not the views of the University, 140 the Univer
sity could not argue that the content of the magazine would be
confused with its own official speech.141
Rosenberger supports the notion that a school can facilitate
student speech through the provision of funds or printing
presses without sponsoring the speech. It once again suggests a
parallel to a computer lab made available to students for gen
eral use. The Rosenberger Court's reliance on a disclaimer to
separate the school from the speech of its students could also
be useful to public schools. The school could require a dis
claimer be attached to a student's Web site if the student in
any way revealed that he or she was a student at a particular
school. For example, since Aaron Smith mentioned he was a
student at the Dowell Middle School, he could be required to
state that his Web site was not sponsored or approved of by the
Dowell School and that the views he expressed were solely his
own. Such disclaimers would at least avoid a public perception
that the school was encouraging sites like Aaron's and might
have reduced the number of angry e-mails received by the
school superintendent.
Of course, the issue of whether the computer lab is consid
ered to be a public forum or not is at least partially under the
control of the school. As in Hazelwood, the court will look to
evidence of any policies and practices adopted by the school in
relation to the computer lab, such as whether lab use is super
vised by a teacher. 142 If the school is anxious to avoid the pub
lic forum characterization, it can make sure none of the policies
that relate to the lab suggest such a status.
One way for a school to to avoid public forum status is to
limit lab use to student work on official school projects con
nected to a classroom assignment. If the lab's use is limited in
this fashion, then the school will be able to argue that the lab is
not a public forum available for the use of its students, but is

140. See id. at 849.
141. See id. at 850.
142. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) ("These ac
tivities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not
they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants
and audiences.").
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instead part of the school's educational program. In this situa
tion, Hazelwood will control all use of the lab. However, if the
school allows students to use the lab without restriction, then
the public forum status of the lab is a very real possibility.
Many schools have adopted acceptable use policies to con
trol use of the school's computer system. 143 These policies pre
clude certain uses of the system, ranging from destruction of
computer files to the sending of insulting e-mail. Each student
user is required to comply with the policy controlling conditions
of use. It is possible that the adoption of such a policy would
encourage a court to classify all use of the computer lab, even
for non-academic uses, as a school-sponsored activity. The pol
icy tells students that their use of the lab is part of the school's
educational program and must comply with the values the
school is attempting to impart. A court might well agree.
In addition, the school may have some techniques available
to control student use of the computer lab even if the computer
lab is characterized as a public forum. First, because the school
dictates the characteristics of the facility it provides, it would
likely be acceptable for the school to employ filtering software
on the school's computers to limit the range of Web sites stu
dents could access. 144 In addition, the school could take steps to
prevent anonymous entry into its computer system. However,
technological limits on the computer system will not prevent a
student from creating offensive Internet content.145
143. See Kristen J. Amundson, Online Crime, Online Electronic School (visited
June 25, 1999) <http://www.electronic-school.com/0198f6.html> (reprinted from Elec
tronic School, Jan. 1998) (describing the elements of an acceptable use policy).
144. In Mainstream Loudoun u. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library,
2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss and motion in
the alternative for summary judgment), a case challenging the use of filtering software
in a public library, the court analogized the decision to provide Internet access to the
decision to buy a set of encyclopedias so that "by purchasing one such publication, the
library has purchased them all." Id. at 793. It is unlikely this same view would prevent
a public school from utilizing such software in its computer lab for several reasons.
First, the First Amendment status of the school library, given the Court's recognition of
the school's need to provide only age appropriate material, is not the same as the status
of the public library. See id. at 795. Second, in Mainstream Loudoun, the library used
filtering software to limit both adult and child access. The court objected only to the
former use. Id. at 797. Indeed, in a later opinion resolving the litigation in favor of the
plaintiffs, the court suggested that one narrower alternative means available to the
library to protect minors was to use filtering software only on computers set aside for
use by minors. Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Li
brary, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 567 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that seven intervenors had
standing and granting plaintiffs' and intervenors' motions for summary judgment).
145. It is unlikely the school could effectively limit student use by limiting the
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B. The content of the speech
Most of the cases of student discipline for Internet use do
not involve the kind of expression of political ideas at issue in
Tinker. Some of the publicized situations involve threats, vul
garities, and insults directed at students, teachers and school
administrators. These situations may not need to be analyzed
under the Tinker material disruption standard.
One obvious limit on student speech is that not all speech is
protected by the First Amendment. If a school punishes a stu
dent for engaging in unprotected speech, the student cannot
rely on the First Amendment as a defense to disciplinary action
by the school. One such example is the category of the "true
threat." 146 When the Supreme Court decided Watts v. United
States, 147 it recognized that true threats, as compared to politi
cal hyperbole, are outside the range of protected expression.
Since Watts, courts have struggled with how to distinguish be
tween true threats and threatening statements that are pro
tected by the First Amendment.1 48 After all, many people, in
cluding students, make idle threats to communicate their depth
software and/or functions it makes available. For example, even if the school does not
provide its students with e-mail accounts, students could use a Web browser to gain
access to their e-mail account on a Web-based mail system.
146. Another possible example of unprotected speech for which a student might be
disciplined is obscenity. However, the category of speech defined as obscenity as ap·
plied to adults is very narrowly defined under the test of Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973). While obscenity is a variable concept and material can be obscene as applied
to minors that is not obscene as applied to adults, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
636 (1968), it is doubtful that many of the reported cases have crossed the obscenity
line, no matter how that line is drawn for minors. Even Mikey Driscoll's "naked lady,"
see supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text, was probably not obscene to children
since not all nudity can be proscribed to children. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975). Instead, most of the cases involve foul language and sexual
insults directed at particular students that are offensive but are unlikely to be obscene.
However, in cases of graphic sexual descriptions that are engaged in by a student over
the Internet, the school may be permitted to discipline the student because the speech
they engage in is not protected by the First Amendment as applied to minors.
147. 394 U.S. 705 (1969). In Watts, the Court stated, "[w]hat is a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 707.
148. Compare United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (using an objec·
tive standard that focuses on whether a reasonable person receiving the threat would
have perceived it as a serious threat of injury) with United States v. Orozco-Santillan,
903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990) (using an objective standard that focuses on what
the person making the threat should have foreseen about the likely reaction of its re·
cipient).
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of feeling without an intent to carry out the threat or a reason
able belief that the threat will be taken seriously. The cases
suggest several requirements for speech to qualify as an unpro
tected true threat and if these criteria are satisfied, punish
ment of the threatening speech does not implicate the First
Amendment. 149
Aside from the school's right to punish unprotected expres
sion, it is of course true that the school can punish on-campus
personal expression if it can satisfy the Tinker burden of sub
stantial disruption. Many instances of threatening comments
directed against the school, its teachers, students or adminis
trators, even if not "true threats" within the meaning of Watts,
may be able to easily satisfy that test. In the wake of the
Littleton shootings, instances of threats of violence directed at
a public school have resulted in many students staying home
from school.150 Certainly, in such a situation a school can claim
material disruption.
Even insulting speech may sometimes satisfy the Tinker
standard. The school may be able to argue that the educational
environment may be materially disrupted by insulting com
ments directed at particular students or teachers. When such
remarks are widely disseminated by their appearance on a Web
site or a forum, or even in an e-mail distributed to a large
number of students, the school can argue that the insults will
make it difficult for the victimized students to concentrate on

149. In United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976), the court distin
guished between true threats and protected expression: "threats punishable consis
tently with the First Amendment were only those which according to their language
and context conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to consti
tute speech beyond the pale of protected 'vehement, caustic ... unpleasantly sharp at
tacks on government and public officials.'" Id. at 1026 (quoting New York Times v. Sul
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). For other techniques for distinguishing between the
true threat and the merely threatening, see, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d
1486, 1495-96 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that ambiguous language does not preclude
statement from being a threat and that the tone of a statement is to be taken into ac
count when determining whether a statement constitutes a threat); United States v.
Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 966 (11th Cir 1983) (finding that using specific date, time and
place in statement suggest that statement is a threat); Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d
874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding that statement is not a threat if"made in the con
text of levity, so that a reasonable person would interpret the words used to be mere
hyperbole or jest'' and not a serious threat).
150. For reports on post-Littleton threats and rumors that closed schools or kept
numerous students home, see Anjetta McQueen, Littleton Changes Rules for Schools,
AsSOCIATED PRESS NEWS SERVICE, May 4, 1999; Kenneth J. Cooper, This Time, Copy
cat Wave is Broader, WASH. POST, May 1, 1999, at A6.
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their studies and that other students may be distracted as well.
Even insults directed at teachers may disrupt the classroom by
making the teacher a subject of mockery instead of an author
ity figure.
Even if the speech at issue is protected by the First
Amendment and the school cannot demonstrate material dis
ruption as required by Tinker, the school may still be able to
ban the use of foul language and vulgar comments under the
rationale of Fraser. As a number of lower courts have found,
Fraser may not be dependent on the fact that Fraser spoke at
an official school assembly. If this reading of Fraser is correct, a
school would be free to ban all use of such speech on school
grounds in order to transmit the values of civility in public dis
course.151 The Fraser rationale might also apply to gratuitous
insults directed at students or teachers. The school may be able
to claim that civilized discourse prohibits such invective, 152 an
argument successfully advanced in Poling v. Murphy. 153 If this
broad reading of Fraser is correct, many Internet cases, at least
if they occur on school grounds, may fall within the educational
objectives recognized by the Court in Fraser.

C. Off-campus speech
Courts have only rarely addressed whether a public school
has the right to discipline a student for engaging in speech
away from school and the standard under which such discipline
would be justified. In Boucher v. School Board of the School
District of Greenfield, 154 the student argued that the Tinker
standard did not apply off school grounds, but, in the circum
151. If Fraser were more narrowly interpreted to require limitations on speech
presented before a captive audience, a characterization that applied to the students
who were required to attend the mandatory school assembly at which Fraser spoke,
then the Internet may be a less apt analogy. Unlike the auditorium, the Internet is un
likely to involve the same possibility of a captive audience except in rare circum
stances. Student use of the Internet generally involves autonomous decisions to access
particular sites or create particular content. A closer analogy to a captive audience
might exist if students were required to access a fellow student's Web site as part of a
homework assignment for a computer class.
152. In some circumstances, insults may be unprotected speech because they can
be classified as fighting words under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). However, since fighting words require a face to face exchange, id. at 573, in
sults delivered via e-mail or appearing on a Web site cannot satisfy this requirement.
153. Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989).
154. Boucher v. School Board of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir.
1998).
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stances of the case, the court did not agree. 155 Most public
schools have attempted to avoid basing discipline on solely off
campus activities and instead have attempted to tie their ef
forts to some on-campus aspect of the speech. In Donovan v.
Ritchie, 156 for example, the discipline was justified because the
list was distributed at school even though it was not written
there.
The Internet compounds the already d.i:ffi.cult nature of the
on-campus/off-campus dichotomy. As many scholars have rec
ognized, the Internet renders vestigial the concept of physical
location.157 Not surprisingly, therefore, the usual line between
on-campus and off-campus speech is much more elusive in the
context of the Internet. Once posted on the Net, the speech is
instantly available everywhere, including the school building,
without any special effort on the part of the student author.
Unlike an underground newspaper, copies of a Web site do not
need to be physically delivered to school. This lack of physical
effort to move Internet speech from one location to another is
both a blessing and a curse in the context of school efforts to
discipline student speech. From the school's point of view, it
may make discipline more d.i:ffi.cult because it will be harder to
punish the student for on-campus behavior if all affirmative
acts occurred away from school. On the other hand, the fact
that the speech can be so easily accessed on campus may mean
the school will be more apt to prove that the speech has pro
duced substantial interference with its operations.
This problem arose in Beussink when the school attempted
to punish Brandon Beussink for the content of his Web site.
The court found that the speech had taken place on-campus
even though Beussink had not used school computers to create
or host his site and had not urged his classmates to access his
site at school or even from home. Since the speech was treated
as in-school personal expression under Tinker, the school was
required to satisfy the material disruption standard. The court
found it had failed to satisfy that standard given the absence of
any evidence of material disruption. Nevertheless, other in
155. See id. at 828-29.
156. Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995).
157. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996) ("Cyberspace radically undermines
the relationship between legally significant (online) phenomena and physical loca
tion.'').
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stances of Internet insults might well result in material disrup
tion satisfying the Tinker standard.
Interestingly, despite the Beussink court's effort to analo
gize its case to Tinker, a true Tinker case is unlikely to occur in
the Internet context. Unlike the ability to wear an armband to
school and engage in expression without any assistance from
the school, the Internet cannot yet be worn to school like an ar
ticle of clothing. Most often, student Internet speech originat
ing at school necessitates the use of some school facility, such
as a computer lab. 158 But even if students are permitted to
bring their own laptop computers to school, the school will still
need to provide an Internet connection. However, technology is
changing this situation. In the not too distant future, students
will bring to school hand-held computers that access the Inter
net through the use of wireless technology. When this occurs,
Internet speech originating from school will be more compara
ble to the personal expression in Tinker.

V. Conclusion
Public schools across the country have recently begun to
discipline students for a range of student Internet uses that the
schools believe are damaging to their educational environ
ments. In response, students are fighting some of these disci
plinary decisions by asserting violations of their First Amend
ment rights. While the clash between a school's right to protect
its educational community and a student's right to freedom of
expression is not a new problem, resolution in the context of
the Internet certainly tests the reach of established principles.
While only one court has thus far issued an opinion in a
student Internet case, other courts are certain to be faced with
a similar need to apply free speech principles to student Inter
net use. The issues that are likely to arise are varied, ranging
from inflammatory political rhetoric on a student's personal
Web site unconnected to any school facility to threats directed
at students and faculty alike sent via an e-mail account pro
vided by the school.
In resolving this varied mix of potential Internet disputes,
public schools are most within their rights when they control
speech that is part of an official school activity such as a com
158. See supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text on the issue of whether a
school's computer lab will always be characterized as a school-sponsored activity.
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puter class. The school may also be able to rely on Fraser if it
imposes a general ban on foul language, offensive speech, in
sults, and sexual badinage. In addition, if the speech occurs at
school, the disciplinary actions of school officials are justified if
the speech creates material disruption of school activities, thus
satisfying the Tinker standard. Threats of violence, even if pro
tected by the First Amendment, are also likely to meet that
standard.
The most difficult issue likely to be faced by schools is that
much Internet speech will originate outside the schoolhouse,
but will still be seen by members of the school community, even
without the active assistance of the student author of the
speech. If the Internet speech affects students, teachers and
administrators, the urge to punish the student speaker may be
irresistible. At the very least, such punishment requires that
the school demonstrate material disruption to justify reaching
outside the school grounds. However, if the speech is protected
eA-pression as to minors and the school punishes the speaker
because of the content of the speech, there is an argument that
an even stricter standard than Tinker should apply. Schools
should think carefully about reaching out to control student
Internet speech when the student does not rely on any school
provided assistance to create or broadcast the speech. Despite
the temptation on the part of school officials to react to speech
they find offensive, restraint may be the preferable reaction in
the long run. Refusing to leave control of student behavior to
parents when the student is not at school and instead extend
ing the reach of the schoofs disciplinary arm may create more
problems than it solves.

